

The following just and pertinent strictures on Mr. ADAMS' plea in behalf of the U. S. Bank, are from the N. Y. Evening Post.— They effectually unravel and expose seventeen columns of sophistry, designed to mystify and explain away the stubborn facts contained in the report of the Majority.

Most of our readers, we presume, have, by this time, perused both the report of the minority of the bank committee, and the report of Mr. Adams;—or, as these voluminous documents might with more propriety be called, the Criticisms of Messrs. McDuffie and Adams, upon the report of the majority of the bank committee. They who have read them, can scarcely be supposed to have an appetite for much more on the same subject; and we shall, therefore, in the remarks we have to offer, confine ourselves to a single topic of these prolix papers; and even on that topic, shall endeavor to be brief.

Of the various matters treated of in the report of the majority, that which fixes the broadest and blackest stain on the character of the United States Bank, is its transactions with Messrs. Webb and Noah. In the report of the Majority, the simple facts connected with these transactions were stated; no inferences were drawn from them; no comments made upon them. The facts alone were submitted to congress and to the people of the United States; and if an opinion has been created in every part of the country to which the report has yet reached, that the dealings between the United States Bank and the proprietors of the Courier and Enquirer constituted a piece of most flagitious bribery, this opinion must be ascribed wholly to the nature of the facts; not to any effort of the committee to bias the public mind.

Such an opinion does exist and is universal. It is entertained by every intelligent and candid mind in the Union, without reference to local interests or party divisions. Presses which have heretofore been zealous in their friendship for the United States Bank have felt obliged to state their conviction that the transactions of that institution with Webb and Noah were of the most wicked and pernicious character—wicked, inasmuch as they denoted an utter surrender of moral principle; pernicious, inasmuch as the corruption was of a description which threatens to poison the very fountains of political intelligence, to destroy the bulwarks of freedom. In this city, the newspapers have all, or with but one or two exceptions, expressed their deep, unalterable conviction of the wickedness of the transaction between the Bank, and Webb and Noah. There is not a man who doubts that these individuals sold themselves to the Bank—that they consented to become its pliant, convenient tools—that the infamous bargain was coolly discussed, and the terms agreed upon by an unprincipled go-between, and that the first earnest of the wages of shame was the \$15,000 given to Noah to enable him to purchase a share of the Courier and Enquirer.

To destroy a conviction so widely spread, so deeply rooted, one would suppose that the first effort of the minority would be to invalidate the facts on which alone it rests. As the belief of the public has not been occasioned by arguments, but by a simple statement of facts elicited during the Bank investigation—and a great portion of those facts contained in the testimony of the individuals criminated, and so stated by them, of course, as to allow of the most favorable construction—one would think that the minority would either attempt to impugn the statements, or to find out and add other facts to them which should give a new aspect to the entire transaction.

Has this been done? Let any reader who has perused the reports answer. We beg leave to call attention to the marked difference in the character of these several documents. That of the majority (we speak with particular reference to that part which embraces the transactions of the bank with the proprietors of the Courier and Enquirer) is a mere abstract of evidence, and statement of entries from the books of the institution. The others, denying no single particle of the allegations of the first, are argumentative, declamatory, and prolix.—They seem to have been written with a view to mystify and perplex a plain matter. They are specimens of sophistry which might have done well enough in a speech, but are wretched in the shape of a report. Delivered in behalf of a client before a court of law, they would have been thought ingenious: rendered in to congress as the deliberate judgment of a portion of a special committee, they must be pronounced disreputable.

In the first place we have a labored argument to prove that the report of the majority is made up of matters not called for by the resolution appointing the committee of investigation. Then we are told that their proceedings in Philadelphia were inquisitorial, and not embraced in the scope of their powers. By the way, this word *inquisitorial* has been a good deal harped upon by the partizans of the bank, in and out of congress, as if there were something so revolting in the bare expression, that by dexterously and repeatedly hurling it at the bare majority, their whole proceedings might be brought into disrepute. It will need a weightier missile than this, we apprehend, to effect that object.

But let it be granted that the committee transcended their powers—that they pried into matters with which they had no concern—that they asked questions which should not have been answered—that being answered the replies should not have been incorporated in the report, and that the purpose of the resolution of congress. Now, all this being

granted, what is the inference? The facts in relation to the Courier and Enquirer are facts still, no matter how obtained. The deduction from them, that the bank was guilty of a piece of gross bribery, is still inevitable.

We would here ask, however, if the report of the majority is wholly unauthorised by the resolution under which the committee acted, are the reports of Messrs. McDuffie and Adams, which repeat the same facts, and seek to overthrow their natural tendency, more authorised than the other? If those gentlemen believed that the majority of the committee had wholly transcended their authority, were they bound to follow the example of transgression, and likewise abuse the patience of the house, by forcing upon it two long partizan arguments in relation to the very matters embraced in the first report? Further—as they did not and could not pretend to controvert the truth of the statements, and as in the report of the majority those statements were given by themselves, leaving every one free to make up his own opinion, was not their attempt to argue the house and nation out of the settled conviction which the naked facts had created—to say the least of it—a piece of gratuitous and almost ludicrous presumption? Was it not virtually saying to the nation, “you have before you all the materials for forming an opinion, but are not capable of pronouncing a correct judgment on a very plain matter, without the assistance of our views”?

It will have been observed, that both in the report of Mr. McDuffie and Mr. Adams, (indeed the latter is but a repetition of the former, “long drawn out”); the first loan of the bank, the overture in this business of bribery and corruption, is attempted to be thrust wholly out of sight. There is not a man of intelligence in the country—not Mr. McDuffie nor Mr. Adams himself—who does not be-

Do not Mr. Adams himself—who does not believe that the affair of the \$15,000, which Mr. Biddle, on the 26th of March, 1831, handed to Silas E. Burrows to be given to Mr. Noah, (for the purpose of enabling him to buy a moiety of the Courier & Enquirer, and for which Mr. Biddle had not a particle of security of any kind whatever, except the mere promise of Burrows to procure his friend Noah's note for the amount), was a transaction of the bank with Noah and Webb. Burrows was the convenient tool, the agent, the purveyor. The story of the two and a half per cent. and the Mr. Enoch Burrows of Connecticut, is a shallow artifice, invented to conceal the real nature of the transaction should suspicion arise—and Webb and Noah understood their own position in this community too well not to foresee that suspicions would be created by their sudden conversion from enmity to friendship for the bank. The story has hardly the merit of ingenuity. "She were a foolish bawd who could not say as much." Every body knew that the editors of the Courier & Enquirer could be bought and sold, and on a sudden change of their course, though no surprise might be created, yet the public would naturally ask, (to use a favorite phrase of one of them), what had been the *quid pro quo*. To keep them in the dark touching this matter, the shallow tale of the two and a half per cent. was invented, and Enoch, the father of Silas, was brought into the delectable company.

the defunct company.

Our remarks have already run out to a greater length than we meant to occupy with this subject, and we have not left ourselves space to allude to several points in those reports which ought not to go unannounced upon. The compliment of Mr. McDuffie to the merchants of Philadelphia, at the expense of those in all the other cities of the union, is one of these. The location of the United States Bank in Philadelphia is spoken of as "peculiarly fortunate for the stockholders and for the country"—why? Because the Philadelphia merchants "are generally men who are engaged in a safe and successful business, with fortunes which they have made, not by adventurous speculations, but by steady industry and moderate but certain profits."—To put this in other words—the merchants of New-York and the other cities of the union are wild speculators, and a Board of Directors could hardly be chosen from them to whom it would be safe to entrust the affairs of the United States Bank! We believe, at least, that a direction could not easily be obtained among our really respectable merchants who would consent to such loans as were granted to Webb and Noah. Mr. Adams' criticism on the word *subsidize* is too puerile to require notice.